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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 10-2748 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                            
v. 
WYDOVE BROWN, 
                            Appellant. 
______________ 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY  
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 2:09-cr-00257)  
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini 
______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 22, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 8, 2011) 
______________ 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant Wydove Brown (―Brown‖) was charged in a one-count Indictment with 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He 
was convicted by a jury.  Brown appeals his conviction.  For the reasons explained 
below, we will affirm the District Court‘s Judgment.  
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.   
On November 12, 2008, two cars filled with police officers from the Newark 
Police Department saw a group of men, including Brown, in a notorious open air drug 
market.  After seeing the police, the men dispersed, and Sergeant William Connolly 
(―Connolly‖) observed Brown cross South 15th Street in Newark, NJ, while holding 
something at his waistband.  Concerned that Brown had a gun, the officers stopped their 
cars, and Connolly instructed Brown to stop.  According to the officers, Brown continued 
walking and crouched down near a minivan, placing the gun on the ground near a tire.  
Another officer heard the gun hit the ground and the officers apprehended Brown. 
As part of an omnibus motion, Brown moved to suppress the gun.  In support of 
the motion, he submitted a certification articulating a different set of facts leading to his 
arrest.  According to Brown, the police confronted him on the street, searched him for no 
reason, and took his keys.  His keys included the keys to a car that he had borrowed to 
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drive to the area.  He stated that the police opened the vehicle, searched it, and found a 
gun inside the glove compartment.   
The District Court conducted a hearing on the various issues raised in Brown‘s 
omnibus motion, but it did not resolve the suppression issue.  During the hearing, the 
parties disclosed that Brown‘s license was suspended at the time of his arrest, and the 
parties did not contest that particular fact.  The District Court accepted Brown‘s 
articulation of the facts for the purpose of resolving the motion to suppress and denied the 
motion.  The Court held that Brown did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the vehicle as an unlicensed driver and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge the search 
of the vehicle.  Brown filed a motion for reconsideration and requested a full evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of standing.  The District Court held the motion for reconsideration 
in abeyance, deciding to wait until after it had heard all of the evidence presented at trial.  
After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the District Court gave Brown an 
opportunity to offer additional evidence on the motion to suppress.  Defendant Brown did 
not offer new evidence and the Court again found that Brown lacked standing.   
Brown‘s first trial ended in a mistrial.  Before the start of the second trial, Brown 
moved the Court to relieve his current lawyer from representing him and to have the 
Court appoint new counsel.  The Court denied his request.  After hearing all of the 
evidence in the second trial, defense counsel asked the Court to reopen the suppression 
motion and consider it on its merits in light of the trial testimony.  The Court ruled that it 
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would not revisit its prior determination on standing because Brown did not present any 
persuasive grounds for reopening the motion.  The Court further reasoned that the 
weighing of the evidence on the issue of suppression would yield the same result – the 
police officers‘ testimony regarding recovery of the gun would stand.  In the Court‘s 
view, when comparing the officers‘ testimony to Defendant Brown‘s certification, 
Brown‘s version of the facts was entirely incredible.  Hence even if the Court determined 
that Brown had standing, the Court would have allowed the gun and the accompanying 
testimony into evidence.   
A second jury found Brown guilty of being a felon in possession of a gun.  Brown 
was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment.  Brown filed a timely appeal.   
 
II.  JURISDICTION  
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this criminal matter under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Brown raises five issues on appeal:  (1) the District Court erred in permitting 
Brown to be shackled during trial; (2) the District Court erred in failing to appoint Brown 
substitute counsel; (3) the District Court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial hearing on 
Brown‘s motion to suppress; (4) the District Court erred in denying Brown‘s motion to 
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suppress; and (5) the District Court erred by permitting the Government to vouch for its 
witnesses.       
A.  Shackling 
Brown argues that the District Court impaired his right to counsel and his due 
process rights by permitting him to be shackled during his trial without conducting a 
proper inquiry or providing adequate justification.  We review the district court‘s 
decision to require a defendant to wear shackles for an abuse of discretion.  Deck v. 
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005).   
In making a decision on the use of shackles, the trial court must make a 
determination about whether an ―essential state interest‖ justifies shackling a particular 
defendant during the case at bar.  See Deck, 544 U.S. at 624 (―[T]he Constitution forbids 
the use of visible shackles . . . . during the guilt phase, unless that use is ‗justified by an 
essential state interest‘—such as the interest in courtroom security—specific to the 
defendant on trial.‖) (internal citations omitted).  A review of the record indicates that the 
District Court conducted a specific inquiry and made specific findings regarding the use 
of shackles on Brown.  The District Court heard testimony from a United States Marshal 
about Brown‘s history of assault and combative interactions with law enforcement; 
including Brown‘s involvement in a recent assault inside the Essex County Jail.  Defense 
counsel then proffered information regarding the nature of Brown‘s prior convictions, 
which included aggravated assault, burglary, robbery and distribution of controlled 
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dangerous substances (―CDS‖).  Appellant‘s counsel did not dispute the record or the 
determination; and, he conceded, on  the record, that the shackles would not affect 
Brown‘s ability to confer with counsel.   
The District Court found that the evidence supported a decision to shackle 
Brown‘s feet during the proceedings.  Additionally, the District Court noted for the 
record that the shackles were covered by a draping over defense counsel‘s table and thus 
would not be visible to the jury.  The Court also ensured that Appellant would be seated 
at the witness stand before the jury entered the courtroom to further ensure no specter of 
prejudice from seeing the shackles by the jury.   
We find that the District Court articulated specific findings relating to the 
necessity of the shackles based on legitimate safety concerns.  The District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in requiring Brown to be shackled during trial.   
B.  Request for Substitute Counsel 
Brown challenges the District Court‘s denial of his request to appoint new counsel 
after his first trial.  We review such challenges under an abuse of discretion standard.  
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995). 
When a defendant seeks to replace his attorney or proceed pro se on the eve of 
trial, the District Court must inquire about the reason for a defendant‘s request for new 
counsel and only grant such requests if the defendant shows ―good cause‖ for his 
dissatisfaction with his attorney.  Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098; see United States v. Welty, 
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674 F.2d 185, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1982).  We define ―good cause‖ as a ―conflict of interest, a 
complete breakdown of communication, or an irreconcilable conflict with the attorney.‖  
Welty, 674 F.2d at 188.
1
  In cases, such as this, where the district court denied the request 
to substitute counsel and proceeded with the unwanted counsel, ―we will not find a Sixth 
Amendment violation unless the district court‘s ‗good cause‘ determination was clearly 
erroneous or the district court made no inquiry into the reason for the defendant‘s request 
to substitute counsel.‖  Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1098.  Brown‘s assertions present no basis 
for such findings. 
The District Court made an appropriate inquiry into Appellant‘s request for new 
counsel.  During a hearing on the morning of the second trial, the District Court 
specifically asked Brown‘s counsel to provide more information on his client‘s request 
for a new lawyer.  Brown interjected to provide the reasoning himself, stating, ―I don‘t 
want him to represent me no more, it‘s just that simple.‖  App. 81.  Brown specifically 
asserted that counsel was not making the arguments that he wanted him to make and that 
counsel had not put certain evidence into the record as Brown had desired.   
                                                     
1
  We have also acknowledged that countervailing government interests are relevant in 
the good cause analysis.  Such interests include ― the efficient administration of criminal 
justice, the accused‘s rights, including the opportunity to prepare a defense; the rights of 
other defendants awaiting trial who may be prejudiced by a continuance‖ and whether the 
request is made in bad faith or for the purpose of delaying the proceeding.  Goldberg, 67 
F.3d at 1098.  Here, the District Court explicitly considered its schedule and the 
significant delay that would result if it appointed new counsel.       
8 
 
After a brief recess to consult with his client, counsel indicated that there had been 
a breakdown in communication ―in the sense that [Brown was] insistent that certain 
things be done‖ and counsel did not ―think they [could] or should be done.‖  App. 86.  
After listening to Brown‘s concerns, hearing arguments from the Government, and 
observing defense counsel‘s performance up to that point in time, the Court concluded 
that Brown had not shown good cause for seeking substitute counsel.  The District Court 
noted that Brown‘s reasons for requesting a substitution were based on differences in 
strategy.  The Court also noted that defense counsel had performed outstandingly during 
Brown‘s first trial.  It then directly addressed the source of the purported communication 
breakdown by indicating that, moving forward, it would address any strategic requests 
made by Brown in camera.  Brown provided no evidence of a conflict of interest or an 
irreconcilable conflict with his counsel.  The District Court found that Brown failed to 
provide good cause for substituting counsel, as required by this Court.  See Goldberg, 67 
F.3d at 1098.   
Appellant also asserts that the District Court erred by implying that he did not 
have the right to proceed pro se, once it determined that a continuance was not warranted.  
See Welty, 674 F.2d at 187 (―If the district court determines that the defendant is not 
entitled to a continuance in order to engage new counsel, the defendant is then left with a 
choice between continuing with his existing counsel or proceeding to trial pro se, thus 
bringing into play the court‘s second stage of inquiry.‖).   Appellant‘s claim is 
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unsupported by the record.  The District Court did not imply that Appellant could not 
proceed pro se, but rather articulated its understanding that Brown did not feel ―capable 
of representing himself pro se‖ based on the colloquy at the hearing.  App. 92.  When the 
Court later made the statement, ―even if you had that option,‖ at no point did it say that 
he did not have the option of proceeding pro se.  Id.  Rather the Court suggested that, in 
its opinion, even if Brown could capably represent himself pro se, he was wise in opting 
not to do so.  Id.      
We find that the District Court conducted the proper inquiry and did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Brown‘s motion to substitute his attorney.  Further, the Court did 
not imply that Brown lacked the option to proceed pro se, and therefore, committed no 
error on that ground.   
C.  Pretrial Hearing and Ruling on the Motion to Suppress 
Brown‘s arguments regarding the motion to suppress are two-fold.  First, he  
argues that the District Court erred by not holding a pretrial evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether he had standing for his motion to suppress the firearm.  Second, he 
argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress.   
We review a denial of a hearing on a pretrial motion for an abuse of discretion.   
See United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010).  We ―review the district 
court‘s denial of [a] motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, but 
exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the court‘s properly found facts.‖  
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United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. 
Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 999 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)).   
Evidentiary hearings are not required for pretrial motions as a matter of course.  
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c).  However, a defendant is entitled to a hearing for a motion to 
suppress if the motion presents ―a colorable constitutional claim‖ and ―there are disputed 
issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion to suppress.‖  Hines, 628 
F.3d at 105 (citing United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996)); see Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a) (reflecting 2010 amendment restating the summary judgment standard as 
one regarding a ―genuine dispute as to any material fact‖  as opposed to prior language 
referencing a genuine ―issue‖).  The District Court stated that it would consider whether 
Brown had standing to challenge the search, and if so, whether there was enough of a 
factual dispute, based on his certification, to conduct a hearing.  The District Court 
concluded that Brown lacked standing because he did not have a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the vehicle as an unlicensed driver and denied his motion to suppress 
without a pretrial hearing.  See United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(―[T]he proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of proving not only that the 
search . . . was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place 
searched.‖) (internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted).   
Brown moved for reconsideration, and the Court agreed to revisit the suppression 
issue after the Government presented its case in chief at trial.  At the end of the first trial, 
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the Court again denied the motion to suppress for lack of standing.  After both parties 
presented their evidence in the second trial, defense counsel asked the Court to reopen the 
suppression hearing and consider the motion on its merits.  Equipped with the same 
witness testimony that would have been presented in a pretrial hearing, the District Court 
rejected Brown‘s request.  In doing so, it recounted Brown‘s version of the facts and the 
evidence presented in support of Brown‘s motion and found his testimony to be 
incredible.  The Court then stated that even if it had reopened the motion to suppress, it 
would most certainly deny the motion because the testimony proffered by the defense 
was not credible.
 2
   
While we believe that such critical factual determinations should be resolved in a 
pretrial hearing, any ―error‖ arising from its failure to hold such hearing is harmless.  
Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1068.  The Court‘s resolution of the suppression issue turned on its 
assessment of the officers‘ and Brown‘s testimony.  The trial testimony and 
corresponding motion filings by the parties provided the Court with a sufficient record 
against which it could measure Brown‘s claims.  See id.  After doing so, it carefully 
considered the evidence and articulated its findings based on the facts.  Thus, the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion by not holding a pretrial hearing on Brown‘s motion to 
suppress.   
                                                     
2
 Mr. Sales (apprehended by the same group of police on the night of Brown‘s arrest) and 
Ms. Rhonda Blanks (the owner of the car) provided testimony supporting Brown‘s 
articulation of the facts.  The Court considered their testimony and reasonably found that 
both of them lacked credibility.  
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 Brown also challenges the District Court‘s November 6, 2009 Order denying his 
motion to suppress.  The District Court‘s legal conclusion that an authorized, unlicensed 
driver lacks standing to challenge the search of a vehicle causes some concern for this 
Court.  However, we need not assess this legal conclusion to determine whether the 
District Court erred in this case.  The District Court‘s pretrial Order denied the motion on 
standing grounds without reaching the underlying factual disputes.  In addressing the 
suppression issue at trial, the Court clearly articulated that it was refusing to reopen the 
motion based on its substantive determination that Brown‘s testimony and the evidence 
he would have presented lacked credibility.   
We do not lend our imprimatur to the District Court‘s legal conclusion that Brown 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because he was an unlicensed 
driver.
3
  We will, however, affirm the District Court‘s substantive denial of Brown‘s 
motion to suppress as we find no clear error in its credibility determinations or factual 
findings.          
D.  Vouching 
Finally, Brown alleges that the District Court erred in allowing the prosecution to 
vouch for the credibility of its witnesses during trial.  Specifically, Brown asserts that the 
prosecutor vouched for Sergeant Connolly and Officer Nevels during their respective 
                                                     
3
 The District Court‘s conclusion was based on jurisprudence addressing rental cars.  See 
United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2003).  This case does not address 
rental cars, and we need not opine on whether such an analogy is apposite here.   
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redirect examinations by asking, ―in the times that we have met to prepare for this case, 
what was the number one rule we always instructed you to do?‖  App. 121, 122-23.  In 
both instances, the Appellant objected to the question and the District Court overruled the 
objections, permitting the officers to answer.
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 We review the District Court‘s ruling on 
such contemporaneous objections for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Brennan, 326 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).     
Our Court defines vouching as ―an assurance by the prosecuting attorney of the 
credibility of a Government witness through personal knowledge or by other information 
outside of the testimony before the jury.‖  United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  A review of the record indicates that the prosecutor made no such assurance.  
Rather, he asked the witnesses about his instruction for them to tell the truth while 
testifying because Appellant‘s theory of the case and cross-examination called their 
credibility into question.  We have previously stated that ―where a prosecutor argues that 
a witness is being truthful based on the testimony given at trial, and does not assure the 
jury [of] the credibility of the witness based on his own personal knowledge, the 
prosecutor is engaging in proper argument and is not vouching.‖  Id. at 187.  The content 
of the redirect examination, on its face, shows that the Prosecutor never assured the jury 
of either witnesses‘ credibility, let alone did so based on his personal knowledge.  In light 
of these facts, we find that the Prosecutor did not vouch for Sergeant Connolly and 
                                                     
4
 In response to this question, Sergeant Connolly replied, ―[t]ell the truth‖ (App. 121) and 
Officer Nevels answered, ―[t]o be honest‖ (App. 122-23). 
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Officer Nevels and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
testimony.  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion regarding the following 
issues: allowing Appellant to be shackled during the trial; not appointing Brown 
substitute counsel; not conducting a pretrial hearing on the issue of standing for 
Appellant‘s motion to suppress and its subsequent denial of the motion; and determining 
that the Government did not vouch for its witnesses in its redirect examinations.  We will 
affirm the District Court‘s Judgment.    
